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 SUMMARY 
 
S 1 The brief 
This study assesses the cost and benefit implications of bidding for and staging the 
Olympic and Paralympic Games in London in 2012. The study was undertaken by 
Arup in association with Insignia Richard Ellis and was commissioned by a 
‘Stakeholders Group’ comprising the Government, the Mayor of London (GLA), the 
London Development Agency (LDA), the British Olympic Association (BOA), UK 
Sport, and Sport England. The brief, issued in January 2002 required the analysis to 
include an assessment of the physical development requirements of the Games, 
including sports facilities, infrastructure, the wider economic and other impacts, 
legacy issues, an assessment of the bidding process, and the implications of not 
bidding for 2012 but delaying until a later date. 
Arup has prepared an outline proposal for a ‘specimen’ Olympic Games for appraisal 
purposes only. We have aimed to ensure that to the best of our ability the issues are 
understood, that all costs and benefits are included in the analysis, and that the 
proposal presented and analysed represents the current consensus on what the 
content should be. The study has not included consultation except where it has been 
necessary to inform our assessment of the costs and benefits, though we have 
throughout been guided by the project Steering Group comprising representatives 
from the ‘Stakeholders Group’ organisations above. 
 
S 2 The physical proposal 
The brief stipulates that the Olympic Village, main stadium, warm-up track, and many 
of the other facilities be located in the Lower Lee Valley, East London. The locations 
for most of the other venues are also stipulated and follow the conclusions of the 
BOA draft report in December 2000. 
 
S 3 The scale of a London Olympics 
Even for a city the size and wealth of London, an Olympic Games would be a huge 
logistical undertaking: 
 11 000 athletes would compete in 300 events during the 16 days of the Games.  
 They would be supported by 5000-6000 coaches and officials, and attended by 
4000-5000 members of the “Olympic family”. 
 Over 7000 sponsors would attend the Games. 
 4000 athletes and 2500 officials would participate over 12 days in the 
Paralympics, which is equivalent in size to the Commonwealth Games. 
 20 000 of the world’s newspaper, radio, television, and internet journalists would 
cover the events and require state-of-the-art communications facilities 
throughout. 
 Over 9 million tickets would be sold, equating to nearly half a million spectators a 
day travelling to events in and around London. 
 Staging the Games would involve 63 000 operational personnel, of whom 47 000 
will be volunteers, many as stewards, marshals, and drivers. 
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S 4 Practical implications of a London Olympics 
The most significant practical implications of the Olympics for London during the 
period of the Games are for transport, accommodation, and security. 
 
Transport 
With the addition by 2012 of Heathrow's Terminal 5 and the present expansion at 
Stansted, London’s airports will easily have sufficient capacity for overseas visitors. 
Other, regional, airports will give additional international connections. The Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link through Stratford will also be running. 
The athletes, Olympic family and media will require reliable routes, traffic 
management, and vehicles to ensure smooth, efficient travel to events at all times. 
Provision for the athletes will be a major consideration in the IOC decision. In 
addition, on a peak day up to 150 000 spectators will travel to the Olympic Zone for 
the morning session, 125 000 of them from or through central London.  
Transport will therefore need to be managed to an unprecedented degree. However, 
if an Olympic Transport Agency (which could be a subsidiary of Transport for 
London) is set up with sufficient powers for it to effectively allocate demand to 
capacity, the projected flows can be accommodated without delays and without 
unacceptable disruption to normal travel in London. 
Such a network management approach is essential for a London Olympics. It will be 
necessary irrespective of implementation of Crossrail and/or the River Crossings, 
and can provide transport for the Games with or without them. Nevertheless 
Crossrail would greatly improve capacity and accessibility to Stratford, and this being 
the case, immediate decisions must be taken for the project to be ready in time for 
2012.  
 
Accommodation 
Depending on the ticket allocation, 80 000 - 100 000 hotel and hostel rooms will be 
required to accommodate the IOC family, media, spectators, and those who 
accompany them. However, by 2012 there will be at least 200 000 hotel and hostel 
rooms in and around London. Even on the higher assumption of 33% of tickets being 
allocated to overseas visitors, and taking into account the typically lower number of 
London tourists in August, the displacement of normal hotel visitors to London will 
not exceed 60%. 
 
Security 
The security operation to ensure that the Games can take place free from terrorist 
attack will be extensive. The attacks at Munich in 1972 and Atlanta in 1996 made 
Olympic security an increasingly important and expensive issue, and of course 11 
September brought a new intensity of focus to the global terrorism threat. In due 
course a detailed analysis of the security implications of all the arrangements will be 
required. It may be necessary to close certain transport sites for the duration of the 
Games, but current Metropolitan Police thinking is that there are other solutions to 
minimise the risks they pose, and these costs have been included in the analysis. 
A provisional sum has been included for the cost of all security for the Olympics 
following consultation with the Metropolitan Police and based on the experience of 
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 Sydney 2000 and Salt Lake City 2002. Security for the Olympic Zone will be 
chargeable against Olympic income, but the public sector will have to pay for 
additional security elsewhere in London. 
 
S 5 Organisation and delivery 
It is critically important that implementation agencies exist with sufficient powers and 
resources to ensure that all the preparations are in place in time for 2012, and that 
the potentially very expensive risks are managed so that they are reduced to a 
minimum. These agencies are crucial: (a) for a credible bid; (b) for staging the 
Games if the bid is successful; (c) for managing costs and risks; and (d) for securing 
the wider benefits.  
Without implementation agencies there can be no Olympic Games, and without 
effective agencies, national and London prestige is at risk. If the management of the 
event falls short of what is expected, the memory will be sour rather than positive. If 
concentration of sufficient powers and resources in agencies with an Olympic 
mission is not politically acceptable, it would be better not to bid for the Games. 
The four key delivery agencies needed to procure, co-ordinate and manage a 
London Olympic Games are: 
 LOCOG (London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games) set up in 2005; 
this is a requirement of the IOC’s host city contract and will be a company limited 
by guarantee with responsibility for staging the Games; 
 an Olympic Development Agency in place from 2005, responsible both for 
implementation of the £413 million facilities and infrastructure budget to prepare 
for the Games, and also for regeneration of the Lower Lee Valley; 
 an Olympic Transport Agency in place by 2009 to plan and manage all aspects 
of transport for the Games, including providing the fleets of vehicles for 
transporting athletes and the IOC family as well as spectator travel; 
 an Operational Command Unit within the Metropolitan Police Service set up 
in 2009 to be responsible for all aspects of Olympic security. It would take 
responsibility for the entire security operation so that it balances risk with cost, 
can respond effectively to whatever threats arise, and is closely co-ordinated with 
the activities of LOCOG and the Olympic Transport Agency. 
 
S 6 Financial appraisal  
The costs and revenues included in the analysis are our best estimates based on the 
information currently available to us. In the absence of agreed project objectives and 
outputs and an apportionment of obligations and responsibilities between the various 
agencies, this appraisal is a hybrid between a cash flow business plan and a 
conventional cost benefit analysis. We have built up the attributable costs and 
incomes for bidding, preparing and staging the Games, made provision for risk, and 
estimated the residual values of the assets created. This produces a total direct cash 
flow for LOCOG and all the public sector agencies that ultimately must provide the 
investment and the guarantees. From a commercial point of view this would produce 
a cash deficit (or surplus) if, hypothetically, one agency was responsible for 
everything. The additional benefits, both quantified and unquantified, must justify the 
funding gap and the risk. 
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Figure S1 Summary Financial Analysis (NPV discounted at 6%) 
 
Expenditure 
£m 
Income 
£m 
Surplus/deficit 
£m 
Bidding for the Games 13 7 -6 
Operating account for staging the 
Games 779 864 +85 
Elite sport development programme 167 0 -167 
Capital cost of infrastructure and 
facilities 403 0 -403 
Land purchase and residual value 
(including value of remaining 
buildings and infrastructure)  
325 431 +106 
Cash flow balance 1687* 1302 -385 
Provision for risk 109 - -109 
Cash flow including risk 1796 1302 -494 
Notes 
All figures at based on 2002 prices discounted to present value at 6%  
The costs and incomes are totals and have not been apportioned to LOCOG  
 
The ‘specimen’ Olympic Games we have costed has two alternative legacies for the 
Olympic Stadium (football or athletics) and two alternative Olympic Village locations 
in the Lower Lee Valley. The lowest cost option has been used for the costs and 
benefits in Figure ES1. The Net Present Value is minus £385 million with financial 
characteristics that include: 
 the net cost of bidding for the Games estimated at £6 million, which is assumed 
to be the public sector contribution to the bid; 
 surpluses from staging (£85 million) and land value (£106 million including the 
legacy value of the buildings constructed); 
 these surpluses covering approximately 45% of the cost of the infrastructure 
(£403 million); 
 the Olympic Village assumed to be developed by others for the legacy on a 
commercial basis and so only the land cost/value is attributable; and 
 provision made for an elite sport development programme (£167 million) for 
which there are no quantified benefits. 
 
S 7 Risk 
In the absence of a detailed risk assessment we have used sensitivities to estimate 
overall risk. Our sensitivity analysis shows the financial deficit as sensitive both to 
substantial cost over-run and to a lesser extent to a substantial reduction in media 
income. It would also be sensitive to a greatly reduced ticket income, but we think it 
very unlikely that a London Olympics would fail to sell the number of tickets we have 
assumed. 
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 The risk assumption used in Figure ES1 is that all bidding and staging costs will be 
5% higher than estimated and that capital costs will be 30-50% higher than estimated 
in the last three years before the Games as the deadline for completion approaches. 
These provisions total £109 million, making a total deficit of £494 million. We have 
not included a provision for reduced media income because it is just as likely to be 
higher than estimated as lower. The opportunity therefore cancels out the risk. 
As well as the risks associated with the estimates of cost and income, there are 
inevitably risks attached to implementation of the physical and transport proposals, to 
the technology requirements of the Games, and to security (including the threat of a 
major terrorist attack a year or two before the Games which could impact not only on 
cost but on ticket revenues and tourism benefits). These risks will need to be taken 
into account in the decision whether or not to bid, but should be set against the 
opportunities to avoid or mitigate risk through management, anticipation, and 
planning. 
 
S 8 Quantified costs and benefits 
We then made estimates of the quantifiable additional benefits to the UK economy of 
income from the net increase in tourists and other wider economic effects of the 
Games to produce an appraisal of the total quantifiable costs and benefits.  
Figure S2  Summary cost-benefit analysis (NPV discounted at 6%) 
 
Expenditure 
£m 
Income 
£m 
Surplus/deficit 
£m 
Cash flow including risk 1796 1302 -494 
Additional tourism income 103* 280-610 +280 - +507 
Other quantified benefits 0 69 +69 
Total cashflow including benefits 1899 1651-1981 -145 - +82 
* Additional investment to secure additional tourism for higher income forecast 
 
Growth in tourism 
For our low net additional tourism figure, we have made a relatively conservative 
estimate (that there would be an increase in tourism during the years 2011-13 
equivalent to 20% of the additional tourism attracted for the event itself) of the impact 
of the Olympics on the national economy based on an assumption that no special 
effort will be made to attract tourists and the effect before and after the Games will be 
limited and short-lived. However, if the opportunity is seized, we consider there is 
great potential for the Olympics to be used as a catalyst to increase tourism to Britain 
in the long term, and an assumption similar to the effect estimated for other Olympic 
cities has been used for our high tourist estimate. This is a second order effect, but if 
it is considered attributable to the Olympics, we estimate that it could eliminate the 
financial deficit. 
 
 
Other quantified benefits 
Around £70 million of the other benefits is an estimate of the fiscal impacts of the 
growth in the economy attributable to the Olympics. The remainder is for the local 
effects of creating around 3000 full-time equivalent jobs in the east London economy. 
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 We have made no estimate of the other regeneration effects, nor have we included 
any advantage for the 100ha of land that would be developed except insofar as it is 
reflected in the land values before and after. 
Figure ES2 shows that the quantified net total ranges from minus £145 million to plus 
£82 million, depending on the income from additional tourism. 
 
S 9 Unquantified benefits and legacies 
There are a range of benefits and legacies that we have not been able to quantify in 
this study, but which would have a significant impact, and should be taken into 
account when deciding whether or not a bid is viable. An optimal legacy package 
needs to be developed covering all the potential advantages of a London Olympics in 
order to obtain maximum value for money to offset against any financial deficit. 
 
National prestige 
Staging the Olympics would have important community, social inclusion, cultural, and 
educational benefits for both the local East London community and the nation as a 
whole. Also, as well as the ‘feelgood factor’, there would be a legacy of over 47 000 
trained volunteers. 
 
Uses of the facilities 
Much could be done to further exploit the physical legacies of the Games. Very little 
of the cost of the Olympic Village is attributable, as it will be funded for legacy use 
and the most cost-effective way of providing for most minority sports is by smaller 
expenditure on temporary facilities and adaptations.  
 
Cultural 
The Olympics would provide an opportunity to promote the cultural diversity of 
London and of the local communities directly adjacent to the Olympic Zone. Careful 
planning and capacity building in the run-up to the Games will deliver opportunities to 
improve social cohesion through the promotion of diversity and inclusiveness of 
minority ethnic communities and disabled groups. 
 
Sporting performance 
As well as promoting participation in sport across the nation, the Olympics would 
leave a legacy of facilities including a new stadium and aquatics centre in East 
London. The key to delivering these benefits is effective identification and planning of 
linkages between the event, its exposure, heightened public interest, and sports 
development programmes. Pro-active programmes are also required to engage and 
secure ongoing participation. This means improving capacity across a range of areas 
including facilities, coaching, volunteer recruitment, and club management. 
 
Levering investment 
It would be surprising if an event of such high profile and so prestigious as the 
Olympics did not generate opportunities for attracting inward investment. Both 
Atlanta and Sydney claimed that the global marketing opportunity created by their 
Olympics was instrumental in attracting inward investment, though neither final report 
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 is explicit as to the extent of this effect. For London the effect is likely to be less 
pronounced because it already enjoys a very high international profile and we have 
not included it in our quantitative appraisal. 
 
S 10 Olympic developments and regeneration 
The overwhelming majority of the investment in physical facilities for the Olympics 
will be located in the Olympic Zone in the Lower Lee Valley. This is predominantly an 
area of low intensity uses and physical dereliction in boroughs suffering high 
unemployment and multiple deprivation. A crucial issue will be the extent to which it 
is possible to integrate Olympic developments with wider regeneration initiatives in 
Stratford and the Lower Lee Valley.  
The possibility exists to build a new mixed use commercial and residential area 
centred on the Lower Lee Valley that will carry the Olympic cachet and will for all 
time be identifiably the 2012 Olympic Zone. If this vision is to be achieved, it will first 
be necessary to ensure that the Olympic developments themselves leave a strong, 
viable, long-term legacy that can be used for many years as a flagship to attract 
continuing investment into the area. It will be equally necessary to ensure that the 
projects are part of an attractive and successful urban design concept that includes 
lively neighbourhoods, distinguished architecture, and quality environments. 
At this stage we have prepared a preliminary layout as a starting point for discussion, 
and we set out the issues and opportunities that should be explored. We have not yet 
attempted to evaluate the scale of the opportunity as to do so would require 
discussions with local interests and, at least in outline, preparation of proposals for 
integrating the Olympics with other regeneration initiatives in the area. We 
nevertheless believe there are numerous possibilities to harness the Olympic 
investment and effects to create investor interest in the Olympic Zone and the wider 
area, to build property values, and accelerate the enormous task of redevelopment 
and restructuring in the Thames Gateway. 
 
S 11 Experience from Sydney & Atlanta in quantifying the indirect and 
non-financial benefits 
Quantifying indirect and non-financial benefits is fraught with difficulties of estimation, 
valuation and attribution, particularly for an ex ante evaluation. The £350-£680 million 
benefits estimated in this appraisal should be compared with assessments of other 
events such as: 
 Atlanta Olympics £3.2 billion in tourism 
 Sydney Olympics £4.2 billion of which £2.4 billion was additional 
tourism 
Although international comparisons can be difficult, it is useful to make a comparison 
with Sydney because of its perceived success despite issues of legacy with some of 
the facilities. Figures for Sydney have been obtained from the IOC official report, 
released in May 2002, and Ministerial statements reported in the press. The major 
differences in staging costs and revenues between Sydney and our proposal for 
London are the additional costs anticipated for security and higher anticipated 
revenues due to larger spectator capacity and growth in sponsorship and media 
income. Differences are due to attribution of costs and revenues between the 
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 different stakeholders and uncertainty over the full coverage of costs and revenues in 
the Sydney report.  
Currently there is a huge difference between the figures reported for Sydney and 
Atlanta for anticipated tourism and other benefit revenue flows, and our estimates for 
London. The main differences are that our estimates are limited by the number of 
years the effect will last and the attribution of growth in tourism to the Games. It is 
our view that we have applied conservative assumptions for both these issues in the 
case of London. 
 
Figure S3 Sydney – summary costs & revenues 
£*million (out turn 
figures) Costs Revenues Surplus/deficit 
Staging (SOCOG) 793 883 +90 
Infrastructure 1,221 432 -789 
Elite Sports 233 0 -233 
Tourism benefits 5 2,448 +2,443 
Other benefits** 0 1,785 +1,785 
Total 2,252 5,548 +3,296 
* Based upon 1 December 2000 exchange rate of £0.37 = A$1, US$1 = A$1.89 
** Other benefits include: Inward Investment - £219,780,000, Exports - £1,110,000,000 Conference bookings - 
£233,100,000, Olympic contracts for local businesses - £222,000,000. 
 
Figure S4 Sydney costs and revenues 
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S 12 Postponing a bid until 2016 or later 
The implications for postponing a bid for the Games until 2016 or later are: 
 A delayed Stratford/Lower Lee Valley-based bid would entail a much more 
serious threat of blighting much-needed regeneration, though there would be 
advantages in greater certainty over the availability of major new transport 
infrastructure. In view of the priority and expectation for regeneration in the area, 
we think it would be very unattractive politically. 
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  Nowhere else in East London would be able offer such an attractive proposal, 
particularly because of Stratford’s transport capacity and connectivity, and most 
areas would raise the same issues concerning blight. 
 An alternative location elsewhere in London would need to combine the transport 
capability with large sites becoming available in five to 10 years' time: there are 
no obvious candidates at this stage. 
 The only way to avoid the additional blight would be to plan the redevelopment so 
that the permanent facilities and development at Stratford could accommodate a 
future Olympics. 
 A bid for 2016 or beyond would almost certainly look very different from a bid for 
2012. Further work much nearer the time would be required to identify whether 
any suitable potential sites would be available for such an undertaking. 
 
S 13 Timetable 
The IOC issued their provisional deadlines for selecting the Host City early in March 
2002. It covers a period of 27 months - from the IOC invitation to National Olympic 
Committees to submit Applicant Cities, to the election of the Host City for the 2012 
Olympic Games in July 2005. 
Figure S5 Provisional IOC bidding timetable 
2003 
May (early) 
 
15 Jul 
 
2004 
15 Jan 
May/Jun 
13-29 Aug 
Jun/Nov 
15 Nov 
Nov/Jan (est) 
 
2005 
Feb-Mar 
 
May (early) 
Jul 
 
IOC circular to BOA inviting to submit UK 
Applicant City. 
BOA informs IOC of Applicant City (London). 
 
 
Applicant City’s IOC Questionnaire submitted. 
Acceptance of Candidate Cities by IOC. 
Athens Olympic Games. 
Preparation of Candidate Files. 
London Bid (Candidate Files) to IOC. 
IOC analysis of Candidate Files. 
 
 
IOC Evaluation Commission visits Candidate 
Cities. 
Evaluation Commission report. 
Election of Host City for 2012 by IOC Session. 
 
S 14 Bidding & losing 
Should London bid for the Games but be unsuccessful in securing the nomination, 
there are still significant non-quantifiable benefits to be gained from deciding to bid. 
The most important benefit will be the potentially catalytic impact on the regeneration 
of the Lower Lee Valley, by facilitating the assembly of sites and allowing a strategic 
approach to redevelopment within the area. Regeneration benefits to the area during 
the bidding phase can be realised through careful planning during the further 
development of the Olympic masterplan so that an alternative ‘bidding and losing’ 
masterplan is developed and is an integral part of the Olympic proposal. 
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 Irrespective of whether it is successful or not, a well-managed bid would also have 
the potential to deliver prestige and promotion benefits both to East London and to 
the UK as a whole. 
 
S 15 Conclusions 
Our overall conclusions on the evaluation are: 
 Bidding for and staging the Olympics in London in 2012 as set out in our 
‘specimen’ proposal would produce a net surplus in the order of £79 million (NPV 
discounted at 6%). The cost of bidding is £13 million (NPV discounted at 6%). 
 The capital costs associated with land assembly, the construction of new sporting 
venues, and the infrastructure required to facilitate staging the Games (including 
a provision for risk) are projected to exceed anticipated land and infrastructure 
values by £297 million (NPV discounted at 6%). 
 The overall net costs of the physical infrastructure and costs of staging the 
Games exceed the staging and land disposal revenues by £494 million including 
a provision for risk (NPV discounted at 6%). This pattern of net costs is in line 
with recent Games and it is highly improbable that the Games could be staged 
without incurring such a deficit. 
 The quantified wider benefits, mainly from additional tourism, are estimated to 
range from £349 million to £679 million, leading to an overall cashflow position of 
between minus £145 million and plus £82 million. Our estimate of these wider 
benefits is conservative when compared to evaluations of recent Olympic Games. 
 There is scope to increase the benefits from the physical legacies (and tourism) 
through changes and additions to the ‘specimen’ proposal.  
 There are benefits that we have not been able to quantify within the scope of this 
study, including the potential for the Olympics to boost regeneration in the Lower 
Lee Valley and Thames Gateway, and to attract additional inward investment. We 
believe there to be major long-term advantages in exploiting a co-ordinated 
approach, especially for local regeneration. If these benefits are realised, then on 
the basis of the figures presented above there will be a further substantial net 
economic benefit associated with securing the Games for London. 
Overall, there is considerable potential to improve the financial profile of the 
‘specimen’ proposal through further development, though there will remain a large 
net cash deficit to be justified by the wider economic, social, sporting and cultural 
benefits. In our view it should be possible to develop the specimen proposal so that 
the quantified benefits exceed the costs. 
If all levels of government and other agencies are committed to a common proposal, 
the potential advantages of a 2012 Games centred on the Lower Lee Valley can be 
developed into a world-beating Olympic bid.  
The most important ingredient of success will be the political priority to pursue both 
the nomination, and if successful the staging of the Games, wholeheartedly. The 
Olympics will require a concentration of political focus and priority in favour of 
Olympic sports, East London, and tourism.  
Figure S6 Arup case costs and benefits (NPV discounted at 6%)  
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S 16 The next steps 
The task between now and autumn 2002 is to improve the benefits that would accrue 
from an Olympic bid so that they obviously justify the costs, risks, and loss of other 
opportunities, and can command the necessary popular and political support. A 
concordat agreed by all the key stakeholders and covering objectives and priorities is 
essential to determine the content of the proposal and provide the policy context for 
developing the proposals. Without such a concordat there would be little point in 
proceeding. 
The main areas for project definition and development between now and a decision 
in the autumn are: 
 The development proposals in the Olympic Zone need to be refined, in 
discussion with the local authorities, so that they are aligned with their 
regeneration plans to the maximum advantage of both, and form the basis of 
further quantification of the wider benefits. 
 The legacy uses for key Olympic venues like the stadium need to be secured. 
 A land acquisition strategy has to be further developed ready for immediate 
implementation if a decision is made to bid. 
 The opportunities for maximising tourism potential from both the bid and the 
Games need to be explored. 
 The attribution of costs to the various agencies and public sector budgets should 
be determined inter alia in order to establish more precisely: 
o what public expenditure is attributable to the Olympics and what would 
happen anyway 
o the proportions of income and expenditure that will accrue to LOCOG 
and to the taxpayer respectively. 
